A military workshop was convened by Article 36 in conjunction with the Oslo conference, and with a mixed group of participants including states, armed forces, international and civil society organisations. It looked at measures that can be taken by armed forces in both policy and practice to help avoid civilian harm from use of explosive weapons in populated areas, including through national implementation of the Declaration.
Participants recognised that harm to civilians from the use of explosive weapons in populated areas, causes both direct harm in terms of death, injury and destruction, as well as indirect effects, often stemming from damage and destruction to critical infrastructure, and which is less well understood but still severe.
It was noted that at present, there is ongoing extensive use of explosive weapons in certain contexts, and where there are likely cases of direct targeting of civilians and civilian infrastructure, indiscriminate and disproportionate attacks, and therefore breaches international humanitarian law.
However, even in instances when explosive weapons are directed against a military objective, they can (and often do) cause harm to civilians. It is towards this space in particular that the Political Declaration was developed, aimed at promoting better practice to strengthen the protection of civilians.
In some cases the reverberating effects of an attack can have such a negative impact on civilian populations that, if fully appreciated, they would be considered to outweigh the military necessity. More needs to be known and understood about the urban environment and structures, and factored into policies, practices and decision-making in order to reduce harm to civilians.
There are some existing policies and practices that aim to better understand and limit harm to civilians. These include targeting cycles and processes, pattern of life assessment, collateral damage estimation methodologies, among others. It was noted that dynamic targeting involves a different methodology due to the limited time available to make decisions about attacks. The compressed timeframe means that measures cannot be undertaken as extensively as in pre-planned attacks, and often in these situations, the focus is on protecting one’s own forces. Further discussion is warranted on the difference between deliberate and dynamic targeting.
Technical factors can also have a bearing on likelihood of harm, including munition choice such as choosing munitions with a more limited impact area, or not using certain types of munitions such as aerial bombs, or unguided munitions in populated areas, or using GPS, / laser guided / precision guided munitions (PGMs), or changing the angle of attack, applying a sleeve etc. It was also noted that PGMs are only part of the solution, can be wrongly used with resultant civilian harm, or used so extensively as to cause widespread harm. These can all be considered as factors to restrict use in order to mitigate civilian harm.
Some participants also noted that the commitment to refrain from use of explosive weapons in populated areas should apply to explosive weapons when they have wide area effects – and they emphasised importance to looking at the effects of the weapon in relation to the target. This has been a recommendation by both the UN Secretary-General and the ICRC, and its application should still be considered in national policies and practice.
Some noted that other approaches can also be taken – cyber-attacks, or attacks that prevent enemy forces from deploying or using weapons.
Information and resources available to protect civilians were also highlighted as useful elements. This includes efforts such as directing commanders to adequately understand second and third order effects and evaluating beyond the immediate vicinity of a target. Understanding the broader context, for examples roads and infrastructure that connects civilians to hospitals, or water and sanitation systems were two such examples highlighted.
Relevant understandings need to be built at different levels, including different levels of command, as well as amongst ‘targeteers’. This includes ensuring that this issue is elevated to the political level for overall leadership and direction, and that political authorities provide this direction to armed forces in policy, and work to ensure it is threaded through to the operational level.
Such political leadership can include promoting orientations such as “zero civilian casualties” or “courageous restraint” which, among other approaches, can serve to prioritise the protection of civilians in military operations and can be crucial, direction-setting, initiatives. Similar guidance could include policy expectations that any use of explosive weapons must hit military targets, and must be clearly militarily advantageous or else the use of force must be refrained from.
Ultimately, it was suggested that this leadership and direction requires political will coupled with policy direction and persuasion in order for militaries to be incentivises to reduce civilian harm by restricting and refraining from use of explosive weapons in populated areas.
Militaries can be encouraged to see the benefit of collaboration with civilian authorities and humanitarian organisations. Similarly, certain civil society organisations can better promote civilian protection if they are able engage constructively with militaries (where humanitarian principles and institutional policies allow it.)
Collaboration between armed forces and civil society organisations was highlighted with reference to initiatives such as civilian harm tracking – including with specific reference to Airwars methodology and approach. It was highlighted that undertaking civilian harm tracking at scale is immensely challenging, and further consideration is needed on how this can be done in a timely and collaborative manner so that it can be useable as a basis for armed forces reviewing operational practices. Initiatives in coalition forces to have minimum standards for civilian casualty tracking that all participating forces sign up to, and employ, was highlighted. It was also noted that for this to have an impact it may, at times, need to be separated from discussions on accountability, and for recognition that these may be ‘good practice’ measures even if not considered legally required. It was recognised that incentive structures also seem to vary between different types of operations, including whether they are undertaken on home territory or overseas – these have different considerations for fighting forces and political decisions.
Awareness raising is still crucial within militaries. Terms such as “restrict and refrain” are not usual legal language, rather they relate more to political concepts intended to improve practice. We need collectively to build awareness of this language and its implications in order to build confidence amongst military operators that collaborative thinking towards stronger civilian protection is possible.
Featured image: Residents of Al Mishlab, east of Raqqa returning back home to check their houses and belongings. © Diala Ghassan/MSF