This post originally appeared on humanitariandisarmament.org

Earlier this month, the UN General Assembly passed a resolution on autonomous weapons systems, with a resounding majority of 166 states in favor. The resolution mandates informal talks specifically on this topic among all UN member states and in New York for the first time. Though limited to two days—after a concerted push by states opposed to holding discussions outside of the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) in Geneva—these consultations will be a chance for the broadest range of states to discuss the policy issues and build further momentum toward international legal prohibitions and regulations.

The resolution notes “the broadly shared view” that the “serious challenges and concerns” raised by autonomy in weapons systems must be addressed “with utmost urgency.” The current content of international discussions on how autonomous weapons systems could be regulated shows that states have sufficient common ground on the issues to be able to start negotiations now. When countries do move to negotiate and agree on binding rules will depend on their developing broader and deeper partnerships and demonstrating political will, in a challenging international environment.

Autonomous Weapons Systems and the UN General Assembly

The first resolution on autonomous weapons systems in the UN General Assembly was passed in 2023. This resolution mandated a report by the UN Secretary-General of states’ and other stakeholders’ views on addressing the humanitarian, legal, security, technological, and ethical concerns raised by autonomy in weapons systems and the role of humans in the use of force. Reflecting the international community’s considerable attention to and expectations on this issue, a large number of states and civil society groups shared their opinions, as the 2024 resolution notes. The Secretary-General’s report is clear on both the need, from the UN’s perspective, for new international law to be concluded by 2026 (something the UN Secretary-General and International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) had already called for), and on the concern at the lack of progress toward that goal in current talks at the CCW.

The two days of “informal consultations” that the 2024 resolution requests the UN Secretary-General to convene in 2025 are mandated to serve as a space for states to consider this report and examine in more depth aspects of autonomous weapons systems that are currently inadequately addressed at the CCW. The need for discussions that are “comprehensive” and “inclusive” was the main justification presented for the resolution. Comprehensiveness means going beyond the CCW’s current focus on international humanitarian law and human control. Inclusivity refers to holding discussions with all states (rather than just the CCW’s 128 parties) and other stakeholders. Collaborative ways of working among states, civil society organizations, and others have always been crucial to moving humanitarian disarmament issues forward, but it should be noted are currently subject to erosion and direct attack at the CCW.

Opportunities for the UN General Assembly Consultations in 2025

Though not the more formal step toward treaty negotiations that some hoped for, the resolution does maintain a path to work on autonomous weapons systems in this forum and provides opportunities to develop policy understandings and build momentum in 2025.

The form and content of the consultations are yet to be determined, but it would be particularly useful for them to address human rights and ethical challenges. States’ consideration of such issues, in partnership with civil society experts, needs to go beyond looking at general expressions of concern to discussing what concrete rules are needed to address them.

Seriously addressing concerns with bias and discriminatory outcomes from autonomous weapons systems, for example, requires considering an outright prohibition on antipersonnel systems as part of a legal instrument. Autonomous weapons systems triggered by the presence of any person, or designed or used to target particular people or groups of people, pose complex challenges from the point of view of both international humanitarian law and human rights law. The digital dehumanization they involve also presents an affront to human dignity, a point perhaps better appreciated by the public than in diplomatic discussion. The Secretary-General’s report notes that several states have already called for this specific prohibition as part of a structure of prohibitions and regulation. The ICRC and civil society have also called for this prohibition. Other states have highlighted that autonomous weapons systems that target people raise specific concerns bearing consideration.

Apart from discussion of policy issues, the New York consultations are an opportunity to develop momentum and pressure—building on recent regional and international conferences the resolution mentions—toward the negotiation of an effective treaty on autonomous weapons systems that is supported by a wide and cross-regional group of states. The talks’ location in New York could help strengthen partnerships and commitment amongst states by including countries and regions that are underrepresented in the CCW’s discussions. States from CARICOM and the Pacific region, for example, have expressed a strong interest in the regulation of autonomous weapons systems, but many of them do not have representation in Geneva or are not party to the CCW. Opening the consultations to the “full participation” of civil society and others, which is mandated by the resolution, also provides an important opportunity to deepen the collaboration between stakeholders that is needed towards a treaty process.

A Basis to Move to Negotiations

It is clear from international discussions that states have developed considerable common ground on how autonomous weapons systems might be regulated and thus have reached a point where negotiations on an effective legally binding instrument could commence. Countries do not agree on everything; there is room for developing deeper understandings on various points; and some do not wish to reach any kind of collectively agreed outcome.

Nevertheless, following concerted work by states, civil society, and international organizations over the past few years, there is now convergence amongst a wide range of countries on certain key points of policy. In particular, when it comes to ensuring meaningful human controlover weapons systems in the context of international humanitarian law, many states broadly agree on the need for a “two-tier’’ approach of prohibitions and regulations, as well as on many of the elements required for maintaining such control, including understanding and limiting the scope of operation of autonomous weapons systems.

This convergence is evident in discussions at the CCW. The current mandate of the Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) addressing autonomous weapons is to “formulate, by consensus, a set of elements of an instrument [on this issue], without prejudging its nature” (which is a few steps removed from actually agreeing to binding rules). The chair of the GGE, the Netherlands, is structuring discussion around a “rolling text,” updated to reflect where it sees broad consensus to be as discussions unfold. The latest draft of the rolling text contains elements on prohibiting the employment of weapons systems without “context-appropriate human control and judgement” as well as possible positive obligations to ensure such human control and judgement are maintained . Though there is certainly room to improve and refine the text, its two-tier structure comes close to addressing the key rules recommended by the ICRC and civil society when it comes to maintaining meaningful human control over weapons systems. Crucially, the rolling text does not explicitly address the issue of antipersonnel weapons, which should be subject to prohibition in an instrument of prohibitions and regulations. Nevertheless, the text could easily provide an initial starting point for negotiations on a treaty.

The question is, when will states make this move?

Obstacles and Routes to Reach an Outcome

It remains an inescapable fact that the use and abuse of consensus rules by a minority of states will continue to prevent the adoption of any substantive outcomes for the restriction of autonomous weapons systems under the CCW, despite many states working for progress in good faith. So far, the chair has resisted the mangling of his rolling text into meaninglessness by those with marginal or spoiler positions. For example, the version of the rolling text issued in November eliminates much of the confusing content of the fourth, unissued draft of the part of the rolling text that was under consideration at the end of the August GGE session. Nevertheless, based on years of consistent behavior at the CCW meetings, it is unfortunately highly likely that little of the useful work done by those seeking to make genuine progress will ultimately survive the process of adopting a consensus outcome.

For now, states range from the cautious to the extremely resistant when it comes to taking any discussions outside the CCW. When the General Assembly resolution on autonomous weapons was tabled in First Committee this year, a relatively small number of states, many of whom have known military ambitions when it comes to autonomy in weapons systems, made a concerted effort to resist the establishment of a more substantial stream of work on autonomous weapons systems under a General Assembly mandate. Their opposition was presumably because such discussions could eventually lead to initiatives or outcomes they might dislike but could not veto.

Some states who consider themselves to have military interests in autonomous weapons systems have acknowledged the importance of collective rules or new law. To conclude an effective and impactful treaty, the participation and partnership of these countries is important and must be developed. At the CCW, though, any collective restrictions that these states may want to see cannot be achieved.

If new international rules are to be agreed at all, negotiations will have to be launched in a forum other than the CCW, where progress cannot be blocked by lack of consensus, a clear and time-bound goal of agreeing a legally binding instrument from a starting text can be set, and inclusivity can be ensured. Such work could be done through the UN General Assembly, which operates by majority, or through a standalone process. All states who wish to see meaningful international restrictions on autonomy in weapons systems should recognize that taking such an initiative to negotiate would align with their priorities.

The Need to Act in a Challenging International Environment

There is no doubt that it is a deeply difficult time for all those seeking to work with international law as a tool to protect civilians and prevent the worst atrocities and crimes. Humanitarian disarmament treaties and norms alone have suffered severe pushback during the past year—including by some of those we would consider to be part of our own community. People and governments have understandable concerns at unfolding geopolitical dynamics and conflicts, and in this context many seem to have fallen back onto the position that the option of deploying more tools of violence is necessary, regardless of what the broader impacts might be. When it comes to autonomy in weapons systems, this certainly seems to be the pitch from many of those who have something to sell. Concern about armed conflict and the need for “options” could be one explanation for the geographical pattern of some of the abstentions on the resolution vote (with others reflecting longer-standing resistance to constraints on weapons development).

A different response to catastrophe, danger, and suffering would be to recognise that it is more important than ever to stand up for durable solutions to conflict and for cooperation; for limits on the use of force; and for protecting civilians, who must endure the consequences of armed conflicts both when they are fought and for years and often generations to come. The international community has the tools it needs to negotiate a legally binding instrument on autonomous weapons systems that would have a normative and practical impact. The majority of states already support new legal rules. The opportunity and basis for formulating a treaty is there.

The GGE’s mandate lasts until the CCW Review Conference in 2026, with a commitment to complete its work “as soon as possible, preferably before the end of 2025.” Though some are anxious to let the full mandate run its course before starting other initiatives, CCW states parties can continue to renew their discussions on autonomous weapons systems under different guises indefinitely. States need to take the work that they have already done and move to produce a legally binding outcome as soon as possible.

Countries and companies continue to push forward the development of autonomy in weapons systems. Developments in broader military AI tools, such as Israel’s use of “decision support systems” to “suggest” human targets in Gaza, are showing the devastating impact of digital dehumanization and the erosion of human control and decision-making. In this context, it is more urgent than ever to for states to focus on developing broader and deeper collaboration and, in partnership with civil society, take the next step of treaty negotiations. As the Austrian government’s landmark conference on autonomous weapons systems earlier this year highlighted, humanity is at a crossroads.

Featured image: Action by campaigners from Stop Killer Robots in New York to raise awareness around the 2024 UN General Assembly resolution © Stop Killer Robots