From 3-7 March, states will meet in Geneva for the Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) with a mandate to “formulate, by consensus, a set of elements of an instrument, without prejudging its nature” on autonomous weapons systems, preferably by the end of 2025.

Though states lack a mandate to negotiate a legal instrument, the Chair’s structuring of discussion around a ‘rolling text’ of elements provides an opportunity to develop further policy convergence around the rules that are needed. This will be a crucial basis for effective negotiations on a treaty that includes a broad range of countries.

Ahead of the March session of the GGE, the briefing below gives an overview of Article 36’s views on the current draft text (issued in November 2024).

Download as a PDF briefing note.

CCW GGE LAWS 26 November 2024 draft of the ‘rolling text’

Key comments from Article 36 ahead of the March GGE session

The general direction of the ‘rolling text’:

• The ‘rolling text’ is currently moving in a positive direction towards expressing a set of draft rules on which there is broad agreement – and that could and should be used as a basis for negotiating a legal instrument. It reflects constructive work and broad agreement on many issues of content: it shows that states are ready to take negotiations forward
• It is an advantage that the text is succinct: regulating autonomous weapons systems will require a short and clear core text of the key rules, from which further operational content can be developed.
• States and observers at the GGE should focus their efforts on refining the key elements of this text, in boxes III and IV, which contain specific rules and approaches to regulating autonomy in weapons systems.

Main shortcomings:

The two major elements missing from the current text are:

1. A clear requirement for users to adequately understand a system and its potential effects in the context of use
2. A strong engagement with the specific challenges posed by anti-personnel systems. These need further consideration if states wish to effectively address: the danger of discrimination against individuals or groups arising from biases in system design; specific legal issues under international humanitarian law and international human rights law; and wider ethical considerations

Key comments on each box of the current ‘rolling text’:

Box I:

1. The characterisation of autonomous weapons systems as those that “identify and/or select, and engage a target, without intervention by a human user in the execution of these tasks” broadly captures the key features of the scope of systems that must be regulated
2. “An integrated combination” could imply that all functions must be contained in one physical unit. This should be avoided. In practice, the functions of autonomous weapons systems may be more dispersed

Box II:

1. The clear linking of compliance with international law with human control and judgement over the use and effects of autonomous weapons systems is central to the whole ‘rolling text’. This must be retained

Box III-IV:

1. The rules the text proposes in box III, 5-7 to ensure “context-appropriate human control and judgement” over autonomous weapons systems reflect a two-tier structure of positive obligation and prohibition on control that has wide support
2. Though it should be refined and clarified, the text reflects several of the core elements needed towards effective rules on ensuring meaningful control:
   1. informed and adequate moral and legal assessments and responsibility
   2. predictability, reliability, traceability and explainability
   3. limiting the “types of targets, duration, geographical scope, and scale of the operation” of autonomous weapons systems
   4. preventing changes in systems without meaningful human control
3. A key element missing from box III-IV is the requirement for users to adequately understand a system and its potential effects in the context of use. Box IV should be reformulated to focus on ensuring that any process of development results in systems that can meet this essential requirement
4. Box III, 6, C, iv on restricting use to objects that are military objectives by nature intends to address the challenge to the rule of distinction posed by anti-personnel systems; box IV, 6-7, considers “harmful bias” in systems, which is primarily an issue for systems targeting people. Concerns with these systems must be considered in more depth, to formulate more effective rules in response
5. “Automation bias” is a completely different issue, which poses risks to meaningful control and judgment and of nominal human decision-making

Box V:

6. Accountability is ensured through the meaningful human control that the text focuses on. Some assertions and requirements in box V might therefore be better integrated and mainstreamed into the text in boxes II-IV

Featured image: A night view of the  United Nations in Geneva. 14 February 2014. UN Photo / Jean-Marc Ferré